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Introduction: The ability to flexibly process affective information underlies resilient 
adaptation to changing situations. However, the impact of social contextual changes on 
affective flexibility has not been examined yet, although this may be crucial to understand 
how attention operates when changing situations require allocation of different emotional 
goals.  
Methods: In a novel eye-tracking task, participants had to deploy the goals to attend to 
positive or negative facial expressions based on contextual cues.  
Results: We found that dysphorics, compared to non-dysphorics, were faster in switching to 
negative goals, but slower in switching to positive goals, when the context remained constant. 
However, when the context changed, dysphorics showed an even faster switch to negative 
goals, while non-dysphorics became more adept at switching towards positive goals.  
Discussion: These results suggest that contextual changes exacerbate the negativity and 
positivity biases exhibited by dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals, respectively. The 
study provides evidence for the key role played by contextual changes in guiding attention 
allocation and thereby emotion regulation processes. 
Conclusion: These findings provide preliminary evidence for the role of contextual 
inflexibility in dysphoria. Results need to be replicated in a clinical sample to further clarify 
the role of inflexibility over the course of depression. 
  





An important mechanism underlying efficient implementation of emotion regulation 
strategies is the ability to flexibly process emotional information (Malooly, Genet & Siemer, 
2013). The flexible cognitive control of stimuli encountered in the environment, termed as 
cognitive flexibility, is contingent upon the ability to switch between mental sets or goals 
based upon the demands of the situation (Lezak, 1995). The ability to flexibly shift between 
changing goals is crucial to develop an adaptive response to life stressors (Fresco, Williams & 
Nugent, 2006). Accordingly, greater cognitive flexibility in set-shifting tasks has been linked 
to higher levels of resilience (Genet & Siemer, 2011). Set-shifting tasks have been used to 
assess “affective flexibility”, i.e., how people shift attention between affective and non-
affective components of emotional pictures. For example, Genet and colleagues (2013) asked 
participants to sort emotional pictures based on affective (positive vs. negative) and non-
affective (less than or equal to 1 vs. more than or equal to 2 people in the picture) rules. In this 
type of paradigm, the inability to inhibit attention to set-irrelevant information and the 
difficulties in switching to new, set-relevant information are thought to be motivated by 
deficits in flexible allocation of attention (Genet, Malooly & Siemer, 2013; Malooly, Genet & 
Siemer, 2013). Consequently, problems in flexible allocation of attention to affective 
information have been found to be associated with low reappraisal ability (Malooly, Genet & 
Siemer, 2013), high levels of rumination (De Lissnyder, Koster, Derakashan & De Raedt, 
2010), and lower levels of resilience (Genet & Siemer, 2011). 
These results are in line with conceptual frameworks stating that attention allocation or 
deployment is one of the key mechanisms employed in emotion regulation (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007). Indeed, difficulties in disengaging attention from negative stimuli, have 
been found to disrupt emotion regulation and maintain or aggravate negative mood (Sanchez, 
Vazquez, Marker, LeMoult & Joormann, 2013: Sanchez, Romero & De Raedt, 2017), and are 




a hallmark of depressive symptomatology (De Raedt & Koster, 2010). The inability to switch 
attention away from negative stimuli and attend to positive stimuli when required is 
reminiscent of a dysfunctional cognitive flexibility mechanism. Thus, it is crucial to 
investigate the (in)flexibility of attention for affective material, as this can be one crucial 
feature underlying the onset and maintenance of depressive symptomatology. However, the 
aforementioned measures of attentional flexibility require individuals to switch between two 
different types of tasks, attending to affective and non-affective components of emotional 
material (Genet et al., 2013; Malooly et al., 2013), without taking into consideration the 
potential impact of contextual factors. In real-life, emotional material seldom occurs without 
the presence of a larger context, i.e. the situation in which affective information is 
encountered.  
Attention to stimuli, within any given context, is guided by the goals of the individual 
within that context (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Vogt, De Houwer, & Moors, 2011). 
Depending on the context, individuals can have higher-order distal goals that function through 
secondary, proximal goals (Vogt, De Houwer, Moors, Van Damme, & Crombez, 2010; Moors 
& De Houwer, 2006). For example, while walking along a dark street at night, an individual 
with the distal goal to reach home safely will have the proximal goal of paying attention to 
threatening individuals on the street. As such, context most likely plays a key role in the 
deployment of attention to emotional information, and as the context changes, attention 
allocation should change as well. For example, imagine that that an individual is at a party 
and that he has the goal “to have a good time”. His attention will probably be preferentially 
directed to the positive affective stimuli at the party. However, upon hearing a loud sound, he 
will most likely shift attention to negative stimuli in the environment to detect if there is any 
danger. Therefore, as contexts change, individuals have to switch between different higher-
order goals that will likely lead to switching attention between different stimuli in the 




environment. This ability to flexibly switch attention based upon a changing context underlies 
the core construct of adaptability. Both positive and negative emotions can be considered 
adaptive to the extent that they are employed in a context-sensitive manner and are 
appropriate to the current context (Bonanno et al., 2007; Coifman & Bonanno, 2010). By 
extension, attention to both positive and negative emotional stimuli could be considered 
adaptive if it allows for context-appropriate coping behaviors (Mancini, 2015). However, 
current measures of affective flexibility fail to take into account the influence of contextual 
changes on attentional flexibility, even though it might be crucial to disentangle these key 
processes. 
Difficulties in switching from a neutral to an emotional task set have been linked to 
greater persistence on a stressful task (Johnson, 2009a), but have also been found to be 
associated with higher trait anxiety and increased worry in the long run (Johnson, 2009b). 
This suggests that switching behavior between affective and non-affective tasks, by itself, 
might not be the best predictor of long-term resilience, and training switching behavior 
without context might not promote decreased psychopathology or increased flexibility over 
time. Corroborating this line of thought, Malooly (2016) found an affective flexibility training 
to be only as effective as a control training in impacting emotion regulation.  This is in line 
with recent models of emotion regulation which highlight the importance of contextual 
factors, and suggest that psychopathology may be a product of context-inappropriate 
inflexible emotion regulation (Aldao, 2013; Bonanno & Burton, 2013; Bonanno et al., 2004; 
Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). Flexibility in switching towards non-affective components 
may not be suitable in contexts wherein attention to affective material might promote better 
coping and greater resilience (Troy, 2015). For example, if a person receives a poor 
performance review at work which might jeopardize his/her job, switching away from 
negative information may in fact adversely impact coping and impede resilience because it 




would inhibit direct action towards resolving performance-related issues. As such, current 
affective flexibility tasks, measuring flexibility in switching between affective and non-
affective components, are likely not able to effectively index a wide range of crucial attention 
flexibility processes. Another important caveat to current affective flexibility measurement 
tasks seems to be the exclusion of inter-emotion attention flexibility, i.e. switching attention 
between positive and negative information, which can be important in social contexts. In 
social situations, flexibility in switching attention towards context-appropriate emotions 
would most likely elicit context relevant responses, and allow contextually-adapted emotion 
regulation, leading to improved coping and greater resilience. Therefore, it can be assumed 
that the current paradigms of affective flexibility are not comprehensive enough.  
Previous research has shown that inter-emotion attention flexibility is adversely 
impacted in depression such that, in contexts where it is useful, depressed individuals are still 
unable to switch their attention away from negative emotional information, i.e. an attention 
bias for negative information (Rothermund, Voss, & Wentura, 2008). This inability to switch 
away from negative information will likely be exacerbated by depressed individuals’ lack of 
context-appropriate reactivity to positive and negative information (Rottenberg, 2005; 
Rottenberg, Gross & Gotlib, 2005; Rottenberg & Hindash, 2015). Therefore, it is of utmost 
importance to investigate whether switching contexts affects inter-emotion attention 
flexibility in depressive state. Rottenberg (2007) proposed the emotion context insensitivity 
theory, which posits that depressive states would be associated with a lack of context-
appropriate reactivity to positive and negative emotions, as there are broader reductions in 
emotional reactivity to changes in the environment. Considerable research has provided 
support for this theory (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; Coifman & Bonanno, 2009; 2010; 
Feeser et al., 2013; Rottenberg & Vaughan, 2008; Troy, Shallcross, & Mauss, 2013). In line 
with the emotion context insensitivity theory, Ellis, Beevers & Wells (2009) found that 




dysphoric individuals demonstrate dysfunctional emotional responding across changing 
contexts. In response to positive and negative feedback on performance, dysphoric individuals 
displayed reduced context-appropriate emotional responding, whereas non-dysphoric 
individuals responded in a context-appropriate manner to both positive and negative feedback. 
Consequently, one can argue that depressed or dysphoric individuals will have difficulties in 
switching between positive and negative information because they are unable to engage 
relevant context-dependent goals. Therefore, in the current study we examined whether 
switching between different contexts impacts attention switching behavior between positive 
and negative emotional stimuli in dysphoric individuals. 
For the purpose of this study, we developed realistic social scenarios/contexts, each of 
which had two higher-order, distal goals. These two distal goals functioned through proximal 
goals of directing attention to positive and negative stimuli. For example, the context “friend’s 
party” consisted of the higher-order, distal goals “to enjoy the party” and “to solve an 
altercation with friends”, which functioned through the proximal goals of “attend to positive” 
and “attend to negative” respectively. Each of the two proximal goals were coupled to one of 
two objects (square and circle), which changed meaning based upon the social context. For 
example, the square object indicated that the “attend to positive” goal needed to be activated 
in the context of “class presentation”, while square object denoted activation of “attend to 
negative” goal in the “friend’s party” context. Participants had to switch between attending to 
positive or negative emotional stimuli based upon the goals activated by context cues and goal 
objects. The switching task was developed based on eye-tracking technology. Previous 
attentional flexibility tasks measure participants’ reaction times, wherein participants have to 
press one of two buttons to indicate a shift of attention (Genet, Malooly & Siemer, 2013). 
However, these measures are able to capture only an indirect proxy measure of covert 
attention (Van Bockstaele et al., 2014). Further, standard reaction time measures often have 




poor psychometrics and are less able to effectively index aberrant attention processes (Zvielli, 
Vrijsen, Koster & Bernstein, 2016). In contrast, eye movement tracking, as employed in the 
current study, allows for a direct and continuous measure of overt attention, and provides a 
more dynamic and stable index of attentional bias (Waechter et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
studies using eye tracking, unlike reaction-time tasks, have been able to delineate a stable 
attention bias in depressed individuals, towards negative emotional information and away 
from positive stimuli (see Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012 for a review). 
In sum, we developed a novel eye-tracking task to evaluate the ability to switch 
attention from negative to positive goals and vice versa within social contexts, and to test the 
role of contextual changes in such attention switching capacities. We obtained the first 
fixation index, i.e. how quickly participants attend to positive or negative goal-related stimuli, 
to test the switching capabilities.  
In line with previous findings from the affective flexibility literature (Joormann & 
Tanovic, 2015), we expected that, when the context remained constant, dysphoric individuals 
would have more difficulty in switching from a negative to a positive goal (i.e., longer times 
to fixate on new goal-relevant positive information), but would show swift attention (i.e., 
shorter times to fixate) towards new negative goal-relevant emotional stimuli when this 
comprises switching away from a previous positive goal (hypothesis 1). Moreover (hypothesis 
2), we did not expect any differences in first fixation times when switching from a negative to 
a positive goal, and vice versa, for non-dysphoric individuals. As a third hypothesis, regarding 
conditions of contextual change, in line with general findings of the existence of switch costs 
(Joormann & Tanovic, 2015, Monsell, 2003), we hypothesized that changes in context would 
increase difficulties in repeating attention to and switching between goals for all participants 
in general (i.e., longer times to fixate on goal-relevant emotional information when context 
changed than when the context kept the same). Yet, emotion context-insensitivity theory 




posits that individuals in depressogenic states show particularly reduced reactivity to 
emotional information because of difficulties in processing the ongoing changes in 
environment (Rottenberg, 2007). Accordingly, as a fourth hypothesis, we expected that the 
impact of changes in context on attention to goal-relevant emotional information would be 
particularly pronounced for dysphoric compared to non-dysphoric individuals.   
Method 
Participants 
Fifty-three individuals (44 females; Mage = 22.66, SDage = 4.19, 18 – 45 years) took 
part in the study1. Participants were sampled from the Ghent University research participant 
pool (N = 134), and were invited based on their pre-screening scores on the Anhedonia 
Depression (AD) subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire – D30 (MASQ 
– D30; Wardenaar et al., 2010). However, 2 participants were excluded from data analysis 
due to low quality of the eye-gaze data (< 50% of eye-gaze samples recorded). The high 
dysphoric group were recruited from the top 25% of scores in the participant pool on the AD 
subscale of MASQ – D30, >= 25, and the low dysphoric group from the people in the bottom 
25% of the scores in the participant pool, <= 21. Participants were invited based on their 
scores on the AD scale of MASQ – D30 conducted at the beginning of the academic year (1 
month prior to recruitment), however, they were assigned to the dysphoria group based on 
their scores on the MASQ – D30 administered at the time of lab session. Accordingly, 24 
participants were included in the high dysphoric group (Mhigh = 30.77, SD = 6.02, 25 – 43), 
and 27 participants were part of the low dysphoric group (Mlow = 18.67, SD = 2.69, 13 – 21), 
as measured at the time of lab testing. Further, participants were excluded if they had any 
current, co-morbid psychiatric problems using the Mini-International neuropsychiatric 
                                                          
1 No data was collected related to the ethnicity/culture, measure of income, education, or socioeconomic status of 
the participants. 




interview, which is a short, structured diagnostic interview (Sheehan et al., 1998). The Mini 
was used to confirm the absence of any psychiatric conditions which the participants had not 
revealed, and which could otherwise interfere with our study. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. The study was approved by the ethical committee of the Faculty 
of Psychology & Education Sciences at Ghent University. All participants provided informed 
consent and were compensated for their time (€10).  
Materials 
Questionnaires. Participants completed the Mood and Anxiety Symptoms 
Questionnaire – D30 (Wardenaar et al., 2010). The short adaptation of the self-report 
questionnaire consists of 30 items, out of which 10 items are depression-specific on the AD 
subscale. Participants had to respond to statements using a 5-point scale, wherein ‘1’ was 
“Not at all” and ‘5’ was “Extremely”. The items on the AD subscale are reverse scored. 
MASQ – D30 has a Cronbach’s alpha of .92 in young adults, and in our sample the internal 
consistency was .92 as well.  
Apparatus. The stimulus presentation of the experiment was programmed using E-
prime Professional 2.0 (2008), and was implemented on a 23-inch high TFT screen, with a 
resolution of 1920 x 1080 pixels and typical luminance of 300 cd/m2 (vertical sync frequency 
= 75Hz). Participants were seated at a distance of 59 – 65 cm from the screen. Eye-tracking 
was accomplished through the use of Tobii TX 300 eye tracker, at a sampling rate of 300 Hz 
(binocular). Participants underwent a 9-point calibration procedure. E-prime stimulus 
presentation and eye-tracking was merged into movie recordings using Tobii studio, which 
merged stimulus presentation with relevant eye-gaze patterns. Tobii Studio was used to 
convert the visual eye-gaze data into reaction time attention indices, comprising the time to 
make a first fixation on goal-relevant stimuli.  




Attention Flexibility Task 
Pictures. Emotional stimuli were obtained from the Karolinska Directed Emotional 
Faces (KDEF; Goeleven et al., 2009) and Radboud Faces Database (RaFD; Langner et al., 
2010). Thirty-seven pictures of the positive category (“happy” emotion) and sixty pictures of 
the negative category (“angry”, “disgust”, “sad” and “fearful” emotions) were obtained from 
KDEF based on high scores for intensity of valence (MNegative = 5.74, SDNegative = 1.70; MPositve 
= 6.10, SDPositive = 1.63), and arousal (MNegative = 3.61, SDNegative = 1.81; MPositive = 3.72, 
SDPositive = 1.91). Twenty-five positive category (“happy” emotion) and forty-three negative 
category (“fearful”, “disgust” and “angry” emotions) pictures were obtained from RaFD 
(Caucasian, Adult, Frontal subset), based on high scores for intensity of valence (MNegative = 
4.10, SDNegative = 0.33; MPositve = 4.10, SDPositive = .04) and valence (MNegative = 2.03, SDNegative 
= 0.20; MPositve = 4.20, SDPositive = 0.30). Four context images represented an associated 
context text and did not consist of human figures. Context pictures were obtained from 
Google Images by filtering the search results according to usage rights, and pictures marked 
“Labeled for reuse” and “Labeled for noncommercial reuse” were used. 
Task. Four textual contexts were developed for the purpose of the study: dinner, party, 
presentation, and birthday celebration (see Appendix I for contexts presented). The contexts 
consisted of social situations and described what was taking place in the scene. For example, 
“You are at the birthday party of your cousin”. These contexts were chosen as they are an 
ecologically valid representation of realistic scenarios individuals may encounter in daily 
lives. Each context was coupled with a context image which depicted the text in pictorial 
form, without the presence of any human figures. For example, the party context had a picture 
of a party scene associated with it. 
Every context consisted of two goals, one which prompted the participants to direct 
attention towards positive stimuli in the contextual “environment”, e.g. the goal to enjoy your 




cousin’s birthday celebration, and one which required them to look at negative stimuli, e.g. 
the goal to solve conflict with your family members. Both the goals had an associated goal 
object, a blue square or blue circle, indicating which goal had to be activated in the particular 
context. For example, a blue square in a party scene indicated that participants had to activate 
the goal of looking towards negative stimuli in the context. Even though only two goal objects 
were used in all contexts (square and circle), the object associated with the goals differed for 
every scene.  For example, in the party scene, square indicated that participants had to look 
towards negative stimuli, but in the presentation scene, the square denoted the goal to look 
towards positive stimuli. This was done in order to avoid a single object getting associated 
with either positive or negative action responses. Further, this allowed us to be certain that 
participants processed the context to make their decision to look towards positive or negative 
stimuli (see Appendix I for examples of contexts presented). 
The four contexts were then presented in the form of a reaction-time task. Each trial in 
the task started with a white fixation cross (8mm) in the center of a black screen, for 500ms. 
Next, a single context image (1024 x 682) appeared on the screen for 3000ms, along with a 
goal object (square or circle; 100 x 100) on top of it in the center of the screen. Participants 
had to fixate their eye-gaze on the center of the screen, i.e. the goal object, for at least 100ms 
before a text appeared at the bottom of the screen asking them to “Press Spacebar for faces”. 
Here, participants could take as much time as they needed to recall the correct response (i.e.,  
look towards positive or towards negative faces) according to the context image and the goal 
object presented on the screen. Upon pressing the button, a fixation cross appeared for 500ms, 
followed by 8 emotional faces (4 positive and 4 negative) presented around a fixation cross. 
Participants had to direct their eye gaze to the correct goal-relevant emotional stimuli (i.e., 
positive or negative), based on the goal activated, as quickly as possible. The trials ended after 
the emotional stimuli were presented for 3000ms. Participants performed 128 trials of the 




main task (see Figure 1 for an example of a trial), and performed equal number of “repeat” 
(i.e., the goal and/or context was the same as in the previous trial) and “switch” trials (i.e. the 
goal and/or context was different to the one in the previous trial) for all the different 
combinations of goals (positive and negative) and contexts. We had 16 trials each for the 
following combinations: repeat context - repeat goal to negative, repeat context - repeat goal 
to positive, repeat context – switch goal to negative, repeat context - switch goal to positive, 
switch context - repeat goal to negative, switch context - repeat goal to positive, switch 
context - switch goal to negative, and switch context - switch goal to positive. These trials 
were presented in a pseudo-randomized manner, such that there were 8 blocks (consisting of 
16 predefined “repeat” or “switch” trials), which were presented in a random order. 
Dependent variable. We obtained one attention index from the eye-tracking data using 
Tobii Studio: ‘First fixation to goal-relevant emotion’. Mean times to make a first fixation 
(i.e. how quickly participants looked towards the given goal-relevant emotion after the 
emotional faces had been presented on the screen), were obtained for each of the 128 trials. 
The ‘first fixation to goal-relevant emotion’ index allowed us to measure the ability of 
participants to switch between contexts and between goals. First fixation reaction times (RTs) 
shorter than 100ms were considered to be outliers and removed. Further, any values recorded 
in Tobii Studio as 0 or blanks were set to missing. For each trial, four RTs were obtained for 
the goal-relevant faces (either positive or negative depending upon the goal activated). Out of 
the four RTs, the fastest first fixation was obtained as the final first fixation time for each trial. 
Finally, the trials were grouped according to the switching condition, and one mean first 
fixation RT was obtained for each of the conditions. We calculated 8 attention switching 
variables: Repeat Context - Repeat Goal (Look to positive), Repeat Context - Repeat Goal 
(Look to negative), Repeat Context - Switch Goal (Look to positive), Repeat Context - Switch 
Goal (Look to negative), Switch Context - Repeat Goal (Look to positive), Switch Context - 




Repeat Goal (Look to negative), Switch Context - Switch Goal (Look to positive), and Switch 
Context - Switch Goal (Look to negative). Hypotheses were tested by comparing the ease to 
engage attention with goal-related stimuli in conditions of switching to new goals and/or 
contexts and conditions of repeating goals and/or contexts. All analyses in the study were 
performed using IBM SPSS Statistics software (version 20). 
Practice phase and knowledge check. Prior to beginning the main task trials, 
participants underwent a short practice phase. First, they were acquainted and familiarized 
with the textual contexts, associated context pictures, and goal objects. Participants then 
practiced their knowledge of the contexts and goals. They were presented with a single 
context image along with a goal object (square or circle), and they had to indicate, by pressing 
one of two buttons, whether they would look towards positive or negative stimuli according to 
the context-goal combination. All 8 context-goal combinations (4 contexts along with 2 goals 
objects) were presented 3 times each. Upon the completion of the practice phase, participants 
underwent a short knowledge check procedure. They were presented with each of 8 context-
goal object combinations, and they had to write down the goal associated with each context-
goal object combination. For example, when presented with the picture of “Friend’s party” 
context along with circle shape, participants had to write down the goal “To enjoy the party”. 
When participants were not able to correctly recall 100% of the context-goal associations 
during the knowledge check procedure, they would undergo the practice phase again and 
repeat the knowledge check procedure afterwards. This knowledge check procedure was 
performed both pre- and post-task to ascertain whether participants retained the semantic 
knowledge of goals and the context-goal associations2. 
                                                          
2 We analyzed data from the post-task knowledge-check procedure to establish that activation of goals by 
contextual cues during the main task were adequate. Analyses revealed that the overall recall of contextual cues 
for all participants was 97.8%, i.e. out of the 408 instances of goal information recall (8 context-goal 
combinations recalled by 51 participants), there were only 9 instances where a participant did not recall the goal 





All participants provided informed consent. First, the participants completed a 
questionnaires’ package3 including the MASQ – D30 and then went through the eye-tracker 
calibration procedure. Next, the participants were introduced to the attention flexibility task, 
and underwent the practice phase and pre-task knowledge check procedure. They then 
performed the 128 experimental trials4 (16 trials each for the 8 attention switching 
conditions), and finally, completed the post-task knowledge check. Upon completion of the 
main task, the MINI psychiatric interview was administered to all the participants to identify 
the potential occurrence of psychopathology, which may otherwise interfere with the 
processes being investigated (no subjects were removed based on the results from this 
interview). This was followed by debriefing about the purpose of the study, and compensation 
for participation.  
Results 
A 2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Goal Switch) x 2 (Goal Type) x 2 (Group) mixed analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with the ‘First fixation to Goal-Relevant Emotion’ 
indices. Group (High vs. Low dysphorics) was the between-subjects factor. Context Switch 
(Repeat vs. Switch Context), Goal Switch (Repeat vs. Switch Goal), and Goal Type (Look to 
positive vs. Look to negative) were the within-subjects factors. We found significant main 
effects of Context Switch, F(1, 49) = 34.94, p < .001, p2 =.42, 95% CI [.20; .57], and Goal 
Switch, F(1, 49) = 66.88, p < .001, p2 = .58, 95% CI [.38; .69]. More importantly, these main 
                                                          
information correctly. This confirms that participants largely retained the context-goal associations correctly 
during the performance of the main task. 
3 As part of the questionnaires package, the participants were administered the following: Mood and Anxiety 
Symptoms Questionnaire – Dutch (MASQ-D; Wardenaar et al., 2010), Beck Depression Inventory (Van der 
Does, 2002), and Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (Connor & Davidson, 2003). However, only the scores 
from Anhedonic Depression scale of MASQ-D were used for the purposes of the current study. 
4 Previous eye-tracking studies have used similar number of trials (Caseras et al., 2007; Ellis, Beevers & Wells, 
2011; Leyman et al., 2011; Peña-Esparza, 2011; Schofield et al., 2012) 




effects were qualified by a significant four-way Context Switch x Goal Switch x Goal Type x 
Group interaction, F(1, 49) = 4.59, p < .05, p2 = .09, 95% CI [.00; .25].  (See Appendix II for 
the full decomposition of the 4-way interaction). Based on our predictions, we now test each 
individual hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: high dysphoric individuals have more difficulty in switching to a 
positive goal as compared to switching to a negative goal when context is repeating 
Significant Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that high dysphorics 
had faster first fixations when switching from a positive to a negative goal in comparison to 
switching from a negative to a positive goal (B = .15, p < .001, d = 1.01, 95% CI [.083; .228]; 
see Figure 2). However, high dysphoric individuals had faster first fixations also when 
repeating attention to a negative goal in comparison to a positive goal (B = .17, p < .001, d = 
.60, 95% CI [.082; .267]).  
Confirming our hypothesis, we found that high dysphorics found it easier to switch to 
a negative goal, compared to a positive goal, when the context was constant. 
Hypothesis 2: low dysphoric individuals have no difficulty in switching to a positive 
goal as compared to switching to a negative goal when context is repeating 
For low dysphorics, there were no significant differences in switching attention from a 
negative to a positive goal and switching from a positive to a negative goal (B = -.04, p > 
.250, d = .38, 95% CI [-.108; .029]). However, there were also no significant differences in 
first fixations when repeating attention to negative or positive goals (B = .01, p > .850, d = 
.04, 95% CI [-.079; .095];  see Figure 2). 
Confirming our hypothesis, we found that low dysphorics did not differ in switching 
from a positive to a negative goal and vice versa during context repeat conditions. 




Hypothesis 3: switching and repeating attention to positive and negative goals will be 
difficult for both high dysphoric and low dysphoric individuals when contexts start switching 
Repeating Goals. In line with Hypothesis 3, within-group pairwise comparisons 
showed that low dysphorics were slower when repeating attention to negative (B = -.44, p < 
.001, d = 2.16, 95% CI [-.544; -.335]) and positive (B = -.11, p = .034, d = .50, 95% CI [-.225; 
-.009]) goals when the context was switching as opposed to when it was repeating (see Figure 
3). The same effects were found for high dysphoric individuals when the context was 
switching compared to when the context was repeating, i.e. slower first fixations in repeating 
attention to negative  (B = -.41, p < .001, d = 1.81, 95% CI [-.528; -.306]), and positive (B = -
.19, p = .001, d = .85, 95% CI [-.312; -.084]) goals.  
In line with our hypothesis, we found that both high and low dysphorics had 
difficulties in repeating attention to both positive and negative goals when the context 
changed compared to repeated. 
Switching goals. Within-group comparisons revealed that high dysphoric individuals 
had faster fixations when switching attention to a negative goal (B = .11, p = .006, d = .60, 
95% CI [.035; .191]) when the context was switching as compared to when the context was 
repeating. However, there was no significant difference in fixation latencies in switching to 
positive goals when the context was switching versus repeating (B = -.2, p > .600, d = .15, 
95% CI [-.091; .053]). This is not in line with our hypothesis, although it is indicative of a 
negativity bias. Low dysphorics, contrastingly, had faster fixations when switching attention 
to positive goals (B = .19, p < .001, d = 1.58, 95% CI [.124; .260]) when the context was 
switching, compared to when the context was repeating. However, there were no significant 
differences in fixation latencies in switching to negative goals when the context was switching 




versus repeating (B = .01, p > .820, d = .11, 95% CI [-.066; .082])5, indicating a positivity 
bias. 
Overall, high dysphorics were faster in switching towards negative goals during 
conditions of context switch compared to when context was repeating. Contrastingly, low 
dysphorics found it easier to switch towards positive goals when the context switched versus 
when context repeated.  
Hypothesis 4: high dysphoric compared to low dysphoric individuals will have more 
difficulties in switching attention between goals when contexts start switching 
Finally, according to our fourth hypothesis, for conditions where the context switched 
(i.e., changed from the previous trial), pairwise comparisons showed that high, compared to 
low dysphorics, found it more difficult to repeat attention towards positive goals (B = -.33, p 
< .001, d = 2.64, 95% CI [-.404; -.260]). On the other hand, the effect was only near 
significant for repeating attention to negative goals (B = -.06, p = .051, d = .57, 95% CI [-
.122, .0004]). Further, high dysphorics, compared to low, found it more difficult to switch 
attention from previous negative towards positive goals (B = -.22, p < .001, d = 1.49, 95% CI 
[-.306; -.137]; see Figure 4). Meanwhile, high dysphorics showed a contrasting pattern, i.e. 
were faster, in shifting from positive towards negative goals (B = .29, p < .001, d = 2.12, 95% 
CI [.212; .368]), compared to low dysphoric individuals. This indicates an overall difficulty in 
deploying attention based on context-appropriate positive goals for dysphoric individuals, 
compared to non-dysphoric individuals, with indications for a negativity bias.  
                                                          
5 The Cronbach’s alpha for attentional variables of the 8 attention switching conditions was: Repeat Context - 
Repeat Goal (Look to positive) α = .95, Repeat Context - Repeat Goal (Look to negative) α = .94,  Repeat 
Context - Switch Goal (Look to positive) α = .94, Repeat Context - Switch Goal (Look to negative) α = .95, 
Switch Context - Repeat Goal (Look to positive) α = .97, Switch Context - Repeat Goal (Look to negative) α = 
.94, Switch Context - Switch Goal (Look to positive) α = .96, and Switch Context - Switch Goal (Look to 
negative) α = .97. 




Overall, high, compared to low, dysphorics were faster in switching attention towards 
negative goals, but slower in repeating and switching attention towards positive goals when 
the context was switching. 
Lastly, we ran Bayesian pairwise comparisons for each of our specific hypotheses to 
provide more confidence to our frequentist analysis. The findings from the Bayesian analyses 
largely supported the findings from the frequentist analysis described in the paragraphs above 
(see Appendix II for more details). However, two findings differed. First, for the comparison 
between switching to positive versus negative goals in low dysphorics, we found anecdotal 
evidence in favor of the null when the context is constant (hypothesis 2). This indicates that it 
cannot be claimed with certainty that there were no significant differences for low dysphorics 
in switching attention to positive or negative goals when the context was constant. Second, for 
the comparison between context repeat versus context switch when repeating attention to 
positive goals, we found anecdotal evidence for low dysphorics (hypothesis 3). This suggests 
that we cannot claim with certainty that low dysphorics were significantly slower in repeating 
attention to positive goals when the context switched versus repeated. However, the Bayes 
factors for the majority of the other comparisons yielded strong to decisive evidence in line 
with our hypotheses. 
Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to examine the impact of contextual changes on 
flexibility in attending to emotional information in dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals.  
First, we found that dysphorics have greater ease in directing attention towards a 
negative goal when the context is not changing, whereas non-dysphorics find it equally easy 
to repeat attention to both negative and positive goals (hypotheses 1 and 2). Further, when the 
context is not changing, we found that it is easier for dysphoric people to switch to a negative 




goal, but it is more difficult for them to switch to a positive goal. For example, when at a 
party, a dysphoric individual would find it easier to switch their attention from people 
enjoying the party to the one upset-looking person in the corner, but they would be slower to 
make the reverse switch. In line with previous research (Peckham, McHugh & Otto, 2010), 
these findings suggest that dysphoric or depressed individuals struggle with shifting their 
attention away from negative information (for a review see De Raedt & Koster, 2010).  
Second, regarding conditions of contextual change, we expected that contextual 
changes would create difficulties for all individuals, but would especially inflate the time it 
takes for dysphoric individuals to direct their attention to goal-relevant emotional information 
when repeating and switching between goals (hypotheses 3 and 4). Accordingly, we found 
that although everyone experienced difficulties in repeating and switching attention towards 
valence-specific goals due to contextual changes, dysphoric, compared to non-dysphoric, 
individuals experienced significantly more difficulties in repeating and switching attention 
towards positive goals, when the contexts changed. Contrary to our fourth hypothesis, we 
found that both dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals seemed to show greater ease in 
switching (i.e., faster times to fixate) towards valence-specific goal-relevant information when 
the contexts were switching. 
Although we found that both dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals experience 
greater difficulty in repeating attention to both negative and positive goals when the context is 
switching, these difficulties are significantly more pronounced in dysphoric individuals when 
repeating and switching attention towards positive goals. This finding implies that as the 
environment begins to change, all individuals need some time to adapt to it, but dysphoric 
individuals seem to particularly struggle with this change in their environment when it comes 
to directing attention to goal-relevant positive stimuli. Further, it seems that dysphoric 
individuals find it specifically easier to switch to a negative goal when the context is 




switching, whereas non-dysphorics seem to find it more difficult to make this switch. For 
example, dysphorics would find it easier to switch their attention from happy people at a party 
to angry people on a street when they leave the party, whereas low dysphorics would struggle 
to make this type of switch. These findings seem to be in line with the emotion-context 
insensitivity theory proposed by Rottenberg (2007; Rottenberg, Gross & Gotlib, 2005), which 
posits that depressogenic individuals would likely display more mood-dependent changes in 
emotional reactivity. Further, these findings converge with empirical results which show that 
dysphoric individuals display mood-dependent changes in emotional reactivity to emotional 
information due to broader reductions in processing of contextual information (Ellis, Beevers, 
& Wells, 2009).  Inversely, we also found that non-dysphorics find it easier to switch from a 
negative to a positive goal when context is switching, whereas dysphorics are slower in 
making that attention switch. Practically, this would imply, for instance, that dysphorics take 
longer to switch their attention from an angry boss at a job performance review to colleagues 
who look happy at an office party, whereas non-dysphorics are quicker to make this switch. 
This finding from non-dysphoric individuals is parallel to the finding of Ellis and colleagues 
(2009), wherein non-dysphoric individuals showed more intense positive reactivity when the 
context changed from a negative to a positive feedback. 
Taken together, we show that dysphoric individuals find it easier to maintain and 
switch attention towards negative goals, and non-dysphoric individuals display a similar 
propensity towards positive goals. These findings replicate previous research (Joormann & 
Tanovic, 2015). A novel finding of our study is that for all individuals it is much more 
difficult to maintain attention to both positive and negative goals when situations within 
which these goals are activated are dynamically changing, although these difficulties are 
significantly more pronounced for dysphoric individuals in case of positive goals. This 
finding of intra-emotion context-dependent inflexibility is in line with the recent view which 




posits that contextual changes would lead to greater difficulties in emotional flexibility and 
employment of context-appropriate emotion regulation strategies (Aldao, 2013), but until 
now, this had not yet been directly tested. Another important result from the current study is 
that dysphorics find it easier to switch towards negative goals when changing contexts, and 
non-dysphorics display a similar pattern for positive goals. Both dysphoric and non-dysphoric 
individuals seem to be quicker in directing their attention towards negative and positive goals, 
respectively, when the situation is the most complex, i.e. both the goals and contexts are 
changing. This finding would suggest the presence of a homeostatic mechanism of returning 
attention to a mood- or schema-congruent ‘basic emotional goal’. This corresponds with the 
extant literature on schema-congruent biases, i.e. a negativity bias in depressed individuals 
and a positivity bias in non-depressed or healthy individuals (Cummins & Nistico, 2002; 
Gotlib et al., 2004). As depressed individuals tend to have a bias towards negativity, one can 
extrapolate from our findings that this bias would exaggerate and become more rigid when the 
contexts within which emotional information occurs are unpredictable and changing, 
mirroring real-life scenarios. In a similar vein, for healthy, non-depressed individuals these 
changeable contextual situations would enhance their bias towards positive emotional 
information, making them quicker in approaching positive goals.  
Our findings have novel implications, both for research and clinical application. First, 
our findings clarify the (in)flexibility patterns in dysphoric individuals, as a function of their 
ability to switch attention between contexts and emotional goals (Stange, Alloy, & Fresco, 
2017). In line with this idea, we found that dysphoric individuals have a greater inflexibility, 
and that changing contexts seems to exacerbate their negativity bias. Further, we can deduce 
that this contextual inflexibility precipitates the use of context-inappropriate emotion-
regulation strategies, such as attention allocation. Given that contextual changes, i.e. shifting 
real-life situations, are universal, this contextual inflexibility is likely to lead to a failure to 




attend to and achieve goals, which in turn will lead to greater frustration and hopelessness. 
Second, our use of a high-risk behavioral design and the exposure of individuals to several 
contexts allowed us to infer that reduced contextual attention flexibility, and largely 
behavioral inflexibility, may be an important mechanism in depression (Stange et al., 2017).  
The present study is the first to connect contextual attentional behavioral (in)flexibility 
to the presence of depressogenic symptoms. This is important as this novel approach can 
allow us to study whether improvements or changes in flexibility lead to lowered depressive 
symptoms and long-term prevalence of depression. In addition, the findings from this study 
can inform current attention training procedures, expanding the focus towards (in)flexibility 
in attention from the considerable work on attention bias. Current attention trainings for 
depressed individuals are aimed towards reducing the attention bias for negative information 
without taking into account the contextual influences on it. This may be the reason why these 
trainings have not been effective and tend to do little to alleviate this bias (Cristea, Kok, & 
Cuijpers, 2015; Mogoaşe, David, & Koster, 2014). Our results are indicative that a contextual 
attention inflexibility mechanism in depression functions in conjunction with negative 
attention bias mechanisms. This would imply that both flexibility and negative bias 
mechanisms in depressed individuals need to be trained concurrently to produce a substantial 
change in depressogenic symptoms.  
Despite the novelty and strengths of this study, there are several limitations which 
need to be addressed in future studies. First, the current study supports the view that 
(in)flexibility prompts depression. However, our employment of a dysphoric sample 
precludes any conclusive assertions. Studies need to be conducted in individuals with Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD) to fully validate the claim presented by the results of the current 
study. Further, studies are required in which individuals at-risk of developing depression are 
tested for their (in)flexibility patterns, such as children of individuals suffering from MDD, to 




effectively ascertain the inflexibility-depression relationship as a possible vulnerability factor. 
Additionally, to tease out the differences in flexibility patterns across the range of the 
depressive disorder, both individuals who suffer the first episode of onset of depression and 
individuals who are currently remitted, need to be prospectively examined. This would allow 
us to infer whether attentional inflexibility is a by-product of MDD or a vulnerability factor 
which increases with the number of episodes, as has been suggested for attentional bias by De 
Raedt & Koster (2010). Second, our study employed a cross-sectional, experimental design 
which precludes any conclusions or claims pertaining to the lifetime concurrence of 
inflexibility and depressed mood. Multi-wave longitudinal studies, employing ecological 
momentary assessment, would be useful in shedding light on the extent to which flexibility 
and depressogenic symptoms occur proactively and concurrently. This would inform our view 
as to how (in)flexibility contributes to depression, and vice versa. An important limitation of 
the present study concerns the impact of the contexts themselves. In our study, we employed 4 
social contexts with 2 goals each which were derived from real-life situations. However, it is 
possible that different individuals might perceive these contexts differently. For example, an 
individual might find the prospect of going to a friend’s party to be a positive event, another 
individual who prefers more intimate social settings might perceive the party as a more 
negative event. As such, the appraisal of the contexts themselves might play a role. Although 
in the present study our primary concern was to investigate the impact of contextual changes 
rather than the impact of context appraisal itself, future studies might benefit from collecting 
valence and arousal ratings pertaining to contexts as well. Further, another related limitation 
concerning the nature of contexts involves the question of disentangling the effects of the 
contexts and the goals. In our study, the goals are enmeshed with the contexts themselves. As 
such, several differential effects are embedded together, i.e. the impact of the nature of 
context, and the impact of the nature of the goal itself on switching behavior. Although our 




new design has demonstrated reliability and validity to detect individual differences in goal-
switching attention within and across context disposals, future research could benefit from 
disentangling context- and goal-specific processes. Further, based on the theoretical model of 
inflexibility proposed by Stange & colleagues (2017), the current study tested only a single 
variable, the affective shifting flexibility. A recent study of Everaert & colleagues (2018), 
found that depressed individuals tended to generate both more biased and inflexible 
interpretations of ambiguous social environments. This finding supports the idea that 
inflexibility is a vulnerability factor for depression and impacts emotion-regulation strategies 
across-the-board. Therefore, future studies need to be conducted wherein the different 
variables of the inflexibility model, such as coping and explanatory flexibility, are 
experimentally manipulated along with affective shifting flexibility. This would allow us to 
obtain larger picture, and thus a wider understanding, of how the different components of 
inflexibility mechanism influence each other and MDD. Lastly, an important future direction 
will be to replicate the study in the current form. Two findings from our frequentist analyses 
deviated from the results of the Bayesian analysis. These discrepancies could be a due to lack 
of statistical power in detecting differences. Therefore, it is important to replicate the current 
study so as to clarify the pattern and direction of effects in non-dysphoric individuals. Finally, 
a key limitation of the study relates to demographic data collection. In the current study, we 
did not collect data related to the ethnicity/culture, measure of income, education, or 
socioeconomic status of the participants. This precludes any conclusions related to the 
applicability of the results to a wider, more culturally/ethnically and socio-economically 
diverse subsets of population. As such, future studies are needed to replicate the validity of 
these results in more diverse samples. 
In conclusion, the current study advances our knowledge of how contextual attention 
flexibility disrupts the context-appropriate use of attention allocation strategies, which in turn 




informs depressogenic symptoms. We found that shifting between contexts made it difficult 
for dysphoric individuals to maintain their attention allocation strategies, i.e. maintain their 
goals. Meanwhile, complex shifting between contexts and goals, enforced rigid, valence-
specific strategies which ultimately disposed over greater inflexibility. These findings provide 
preliminary evidence for the existence of an essential role of context-based attention 
flexibility in explaining depression, and could spur further future research into examining this 
possible, crucial determinant of depression.   
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Figure 1 Trial sequence in the task. All times are in milliseconds. 
Figure 2 The time to make first fixations for both high and low dysphorics for each level of 
repeat goal and switch goal, when the context remained constant (i.e. context repeat 
condition). The first fixation times are provided for both ‘look to positive’ and ‘look to 
negative’ goals. First fixation times presented in milliseconds (along the y-axis). This figure 
provides within-group comparisons for the context repeat condition. Error bars represent 
standard error. 
Figure 3 The time to make first fixations for both high and low dysphorics for each level of 
repeat goal and switch goal, when the context switched (i.e. context switch condition). The 
first fixation times are provided for both ‘look to positive’ and ‘look to negative’ goals. First 
fixation times presented in milliseconds (along the y-axis). This figure provides between-
group comparisons for the context switch condition. Error bars represent standard error. 
Figure 4 The time to make first fixations for both high and low dysphorics for each level of 
repeat goal and switch goal, when the context remained constant (i.e. context repeat 
condition) versus when the context switched (i.e. context switch condition). The first fixation 
times are provided for both ‘look to positive’ and ‘look to negative’ goals. First fixation times 
presented in milliseconds (along the y-axis). The figure provides within-group comparisons. 
Error bars represent standard error. 
  































A description of the 4 social contexts developed for this study. Participants were presented 
with the text of each social context which briefly explained what took place in the context, 
along with the two goals that could be activated in each context. Along with the text, 
participants were presented with the 2 goal-activating objects, square and circle, which were 
associated with different goals in different contexts. Lastly, participants were also presented 
the context picture which represented the textual context in a pictorial form. 
 
Context Goal Context Picture 
Dinner with colleagues: 
 
To have an enjoyable dinner, 
it is best to pay attention to 
people who look positive. 
 
To avoid getting sick by 
eating bad food, it is best to 




         To have an 
          Enjoyable 
         Dinner 
 
 
         To avoid 





To enjoy the party, it is best 
to pay attention to people 
who look positive. 
 
After hearing a loud bang, to 
protect self from harm, it is 
best to pay attention to 




             To enjoy the 
                  Party 
 
 
        
               To protect 
                Self from 
                   harm 
 






To appear confident about 
your presentation, it is best 
to pay attention to people 
who look positive. 
 
To not leave people with 
doubts about your 
presentation, it is best to pay 






                To appear 




                To not 
            leave doubts 
                 about 




To enjoy the birthday 
celebration, it is best to pay 
attention to people who look 
positive 
 
To solve a conflict you had 
with your relatives, it is best 
to pay attention to people 




               To enjoy 
              Birthday 
             Celebration 
 
 
                To solve  
              Conflict you 
               Had with 









Here, we present the 4-way interaction decomposition below: 
 Source  Test-value p-value Effect Size 
2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Goal Switch) x 2 (Goal Type) 
x 2 (Group) 
F(1, 49) = 4.59 p < .05* p2 = .09 
2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Goal Switch) x 2 (Group) 
(Goal Type level: Look to positive) 
F(1, 49) = 2.04 p = .16 p2 = .04
2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Goal Switch) x 2 (Group) 
(Goal Type level: Look to negative) 
F(1, 49) =.65 p = .42 p2 = .01
2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Goal Type) x 2 (Group) 
(Goal Switch level: Repeat goal) 
F(1, 49) = 2.46 p = .12 p2 = .05
2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Goal Type) x 2 (Group) 
(Goal Switch level: Switch goal) 
F(1, 49) = 19.24 p < .001** p2 = .28
2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Group) 
(Goal Type level: Look to positive) 
F(1, 49) = 18.36 p < .001** p2 = .27
2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Group) 
(Goal Type level: Look to negative) 
F(1, 49) = 2.84 p = .056 p2 = .07
T-test for variable Context Switch (Level: Switch 
context) 
t(49) =.5.29 p < .001** d
T-test for variable Context Switch (Level: Repeat 
context) 
t(49) =.32 p = .752 d = .09 
 
  




Here, we present the 3-way interaction decomposition for the high dysphoric group: 
 Source  Test-value p-value Effect Size 
2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Goal Switch) x 2 (Goal Type)  F(1, 23) = 14.42 p = .001** p2 = .39 
2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Goal Switch) 
(Goal Type level: Look to positive) 
F(1, 23) = 7.20 p = .013* p2 = .24
2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Goal Switch) 
(Goal Type level: Look to negative) 
F(1, 23) = 40.60 p < .001** p2 = .64
2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Goal Type) 
(Goal Switch level: Repeat goal) 
F(1, 23) = 11.97 p = .002* p2 = .34
2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Goal Type) 
(Goal Switch level: Switch goal) 
F(1, 23) = 4.54 p < .04* p2 = .17
 
Here, we present the 3-way interaction decomposition for the low dysphoric group: 
 Source  Test-value p-value Effect Size 
2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Goal Switch) x 2 (Goal Type)  F(1, 26) = 9.49 p = .005* p2 = .27 
2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Goal Switch) 
(Goal Type level: Look to positive) 
F(1, 26) = 24.88 p < .001** p2 = .49
2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Goal Switch) 
(Goal Type level: Look to negative) 
F(1, 26) = 52.90 p < .001** p2 = .67
2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Goal Type) 
(Goal Switch level: Repeat goal) 
F(1, 26) = 140.65 p = .002* p2 = .84
2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Goal Type) 
(Goal Switch level: Switch goal) 
F(1, 26) = 21.29 p < .001** p2 = .45
 
  





We conducted analyses using JASP (version 0.9.2.0; 2019). We used BF10, which is the 
probability of the alternative hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis, and we employed 
default priors (Cauchy scale: .0707) in our analyses. We interpreted the Bayes factors as 
follows: BF10 < .01 = Decisive evidence for H0; BF10 = .01 - .033 = Very strong evidence 
for H0; BF10 = .033 - .1 = Strong evidence for H0; BF10 = .1 - .33 = Substantial evidence for 
H0; BF10 = .3 – 1 = Anecdotal evidence for H0; BF10 = 1 = no evidence for either 
hypothesis; BF10 = 1 – 3 = Anecdotal evidence for H1; BF10 = 3 – 10 = Substantial evidence 
for H1; BF10 = 10 – 30 = Strong evidence for H1; BF10 = 30 – 100 = Very strong evidence 
for H1; BF10 > 100 = Decisive evidence for H1. 
First hypothesis 
When the context was constant (i.e., repeated from the previous trial), using Bayesian paired 
t-test comparison we found strong evidence (BF = 53.81) suggesting that high dysphoric 
individuals had faster first fixations when switching from a positive to a negative goal in 
comparison to switching from a negative to a positive goal. Similarly, when the context 
remained constant, we found substantial evidence (BF = 7.30) indicating that high dysphoric 
individuals had faster first fixations when repeating attention to a negative goal in comparison 
to a positive goal. These findings are consistent with the frequentist analysis. 
Second hypothesis 
Using Bayesian paired t-test comparison, we found substantial evidence for the null (BF = 
.24) indicating that for low dysphorics there were no significant differences in first fixations 
when repeating attention to negative or positive goals, when the context was constant. This 
finding is consistent with the frequentist analysis. However, we found anecdotal evidence in 
favor of the null (BF = .49) indicating that we could not claim with certainty that there were 




no significant differences for low dysphorics in switching attention to positive or negative 
goals when the context was constant. This finding deviates from the result from the 
frequentist analysis, wherein we found a statistically significant result for no differences in 
switching towards positive or negative goals when context is repeating. This discrepancy 
suggests that we cannot ultimately conclude with certainty, and replication of the study is 
needed in order to clarify this finding.   
Third hypothesis 
Repeating goals. In line with our third hypothesis that contextual changes would create 
difficulties for all individuals, using Bayesian paired t-test comparisons we found very strong 
to decisive evidence indicating that high dysphorics were slower when repeating attention to 
positive (BF = 50.70) and negative (BF >100) goals. Further, we found decisive evidence (BF 
> 100) indicating that low dysphoric individuals were slower when repeating attention to 
negative goals. These findings are consistent with the frequentist analysis. However, for the 
comparison between context repeat vs. context switch when repeating attention to positive we 
found anecdotal evidence (BF = 2.81) for low dysphorics. This suggests that we cannot claim 
that low dysphorics were significantly slower in repeating attention to positive goals when the 
context switched versus repeating. This finding deviates somewhat from the frequentist 
analysis, wherein we found that low dysphorics were significantly slower to repeat attention 
to positive goals when context switched vs. when context repeated. Once again, this 
discrepancy suggests that we cannot ultimately conclude with certainty, and replication of the 
study is needed in order to clarify this finding. 
Switching goals. Bayesian paired t-test comparisons provided substantial evidence (BF = 
3.04) indicating that high dysphoric individuals had faster fixations when switching attention 
from a positive to a negative goal when the context was switching as compared to when the 
context was repeating. However, when switching from negative to positive goals, we found 




substantial evidence for the null (BF = .15), indicating that there were no significant 
differences for high dysphorics in fixation latencies when the context was switching vs. when 
the context was repeating. In contrast, we found decisive evidence (BF >100) indicating that 
low dysphoric individuals had faster first fixations when switching attention from a negative 
to a positive goal when the context was switching as compared to when the context was 
repeating. However, when switching from a positive to a negative goal, we found substantial 
evidence for the null (BF = .28), suggesting a consistent lack of differences in fixation times 
when the context was switching vs. repeating. These results are in line with our findings from 
the frequentist analysis, as reported in the manuscript. 
Fourth hypothesis 
For conditions where the context switched (i.e., changed from the previous trial), pairwise 
comparisons found decisive evidence indicating that high, compared to low dysphorics, found 
it more difficult to both repeat attention (BF > 100) and switch attention (BF >100) towards 
positive goals. Meanwhile, we only found anecdotal evidence (BF = 2.67) indicating that high 
dysphorics had more difficulties compared to low dysphorics in repeating attention to 
negative goals when context was switching. Finally, we found substantial evidence for the 
null (BF = .01) when switching towards negative goals. This indicates that high dysphorics, 
compared to low dysphorics, were faster in switching attention from positive towards negative 
goals when the context was switching. Again, these results are consistent with findings from 
the frequentist analysis. 
  





This table provides the correlation between the scores on the Anhedonic Depression subscale 
of Mood and Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire – D30 (MASQ – D30)  and the 8 attention 
switching indices. In the second column correlations are provided for attention switching 
indices and the overall scores on MASQ – D 30. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
(2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 Attention switching index
  
Anhedonic Depression subscale (p-
value) 
Total MASQ – D30 (p-
value) 
Context repeat – Goal repeat 
(Look to negative) 
.14 (p = .32) .07 (p = .62) 
Context repeat – Goal repeat 
(Look to positive) 
.31* (p = .029) .27 (p = .056) 
Context repeat – Goal switch 
(Look to negative) 
-.54** (p < .001) -.38** (p = .006) 
Context repeat – Goal switch 
(Look to positive) 
.17 (p = .25) .23 (p = .11) 
Context switch – Goal repeat 
(Look to negative) 
.19 (p = .17) .18 (p = .19) 
Context switch – Goal repeat 
(Look to positive) 
.68** (p < .001) .55** (p < .001) 
Context switch – Goal switch 
(Look to negative) 
-.60** (p < .001) -.48** (p < .001) 
Context switch – Goal switch 
(Look to positive) 
.35* (p = .012) .29* (p = .035) 
 
  





During the attention flexibility task, participants were introduced to the 4 contexts, 
their associated goals, and the corresponding context picture and the goal objects. Participants 
memorized this information, which was then presented in the form of a reaction-time task 
using eye-tracking. Each trial for the task began with a fixation cross for 500ms. This was 
replaced by a picture of a context with a goal object on top of it. After fixation on the goal 
object for 100ms, participants saw the sentence “Press spacebar for faces”. At this point 
participants could take as long as they needed to recall the correct response (attend to positive 
or attend to negative), based upon the context picture and the goal object combination 
presented on the screen. Once the participants were ready, they pressed the spacebar and saw 
a fixation cross for 500ms, followed by 8 emotional faces around the cross. 
Data Preparation. In order to assess how quickly participants were able to mental-
shift between different contextual goals, we measured the time it took participants to press the 
spacebar. We obtained the total presentation time of context and goal cue for each trial, 
measured from the moment the context picture appeared on the screen with the goal object on 
top of it until the moment participants pressed the spacebar to view the faces. Total cue 
presentation times were obtained for each of the 128 trials. From the total cue presentation 
times we were able to calculate the set-shifting variables. We calculated 8 set-shifting 
variables: Repeat Context - Repeat Goal (Look to positive), Repeat Context - Repeat Goal 
(Look to negative), Repeat Context - Switch Goal (Look to positive), Repeat Context - Switch 
Goal (Look to negative), Switch Context - Repeat Goal (Look to positive), Switch Context - 
Repeat Goal (Look to negative), Switch Context - Switch Goal (Look to positive), and Switch 
Context - Switch Goal (Look to negative). This index allowed us to ascertain how quickly 
participants were able to mentally set-shift between the different contextual goals, separately 
from the attention switching indices. 




Results. A 2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Goal Switch) x 2 (Goal) x 2 (Group) mixed 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with the ‘Total cue presentation time’ variable 
as dependent variable. Group (High vs. Low dysphorics) was the between-subjects factor. 
Context Switch (Repeat vs. Switch Context), Goal Switch (Repeat vs. Switch Goal), and Goal 
(Look to positive vs. look to negative) were the within-subjects factors. We found significant 
main effects for Context Switch, F(1, 49) = 100.89, p < .001, p2 =.67, Goal Switch, F(1, 49) 
= 43.95, p < .001, p2 = .47, and Goal, F(1,49) = 34.75, p < .001, p2 = .42. These main 
effects were qualified by a significant three-way Context Switch x Goal Switch x Group 
interaction, F(1, 49) = 6.62, p = .013, p2 = .12. 
In order to decompose the significant 3-way interaction above, we conducted four 
separate 2 (Context Switch) x 2 (Group) mixed ANOVAs for each level of Goal Switch. We 
found 4 significant interactions. First, we found significant Context Switch x Group 
interactions for the ‘Goal Repeat’ level when the goal was positive,  F(1,49) = 23.12, p < 
.001, p2 = .32, and when the goal was negative, F(1,49) = 40.14, p < .001, p2 = .45. Next, 
we found significant Context Switch x Group interactions for the ‘Goal Switch’ level when 
the goal was positive, F(1,49) = 33.82, p < .001, p2 = .41, and when the goal was negative, 
F(1,49) = 56.79, p < .001, p2 = .54. 
Significant Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that high dysphorics had 
longer presentation times (i.e. they took longer to press the spacebar) when the context 
switched, compared to when the context was repeating, both while repeating positive goals (p 
< .001) and while switching towards positive goals (p < .001). Meanwhile within-group 
comparisons showed that low dysphorics did not have significantly longer presentation times 
(i.e. they were faster in pressing the spacebar) when context switched, compared to when the 
context was repeating, both while repeating positive goals (p = .121) and while switching 




towards positive goals (p = .128). Further, significant within-group comparisons revealed that 
high dysphorics also had longer presentation times when the context switched, as opposed to 
when it repeated, both while repeating negative goals (p < .001) and when switching towards 
negative goals (p < .001). Low dysphorics, on the other hand, had significantly longer 
presentation times when the context switched, compared to when the context repeated, when 
repeating negative goals (p = .039). However, low dysphorics did not have significantly 
longer presentation times when the context switched, while switching attention towards 
negative goals (p = .230). Lastly, significant pairwise comparison revealed that high 
compared to low dysphoric individuals had longer presentation times when the context 
switched, both while repeating and switching to both positive and negative goals (all ps < 
.001; see Figure 1 below). 
 
Figure 1 Reaction times (i.e., time to press spacebar) are presented for both high and low 
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switch context) and Goal Switch (Repeat vs. switch goal). Times are presented in seconds 
(along the y-axis). High = high Dysphoric, Low = low Dysphoric. 
